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MEDICAL TREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED
INFANTS: WHO SHOULD MAKE THE
DECISION?
I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent does the government have the right to intervene be-
tween parent and physician in the decision about the care and treatment
of a handicapped newborn? Recent court cases have held that the right
to decline medical treatment is a part of our constitutional right to pri-
vacy.1 But who decides in the case of an infant? As Professor Robyn S.
Shapiro2 has stated, "[T]he defective newborn... [has a] substantive
right to refuse potentially life-prolonging treatment. However, it is diffi-
cult to ensure that the newborn's right is protected and implemented.
The newborn himself cannot assert this right and his right may conflict
with the rights of his parents."3
Society is concerned with the moral fiber of its people as well as
their physical well-being.4 Therefore, society wants the interests of the
handicapped infant protected. Pursuant to the right of privacy, individu-
als have a right to determine their own medical treatment, but in the case
of a handicapped infant, many people must participate in the treatment
decision in order to protect the infant's interest. The Supreme Court
decision, Bowen v. American Hospital Association' concerning Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,6 limited the direct federal involve-
ment in the decision making process. Mandated, blanket regulations are
not the answer. Because the factors in each infant's case vary greatly, an
1. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647, 663, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See also Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, -, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (right to privacy is a constitutional guarantee "against
unwanted infringements of bodily integrity in appropriate circumstances") (citing In re Quinlan).
2. Assistant Adjunct Professor, Marquette University Law School; Assistant Director, Re-
gional Center for the Study of Bioethics, Medical College of Wisconsin; member, Medical College of
Wisconsin/Marquette University Law School Liaison Committee; partner in the Menomonee Falls,
Wisconsin, law firm of Barr & Shapiro; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977.
3. Shapiro, Medical Treatment of Defective Newborns" An Answer to the 'Baby Doe' Dilemma,
20 HARV. J. oN LEGIS. 137 (1983).
4. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
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ad hoe analysis of each situation would strike a balance among the rights
of all parties involved.
II. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Although the right to privacy is crucial to the "baby doe" cases, the
Constitution makes no express guarantee of a right to privacy.7 The
Supreme Court, nevertheless, has found the guarantee in a line of cases
beginning in 1886. In Boyd v. United States8 the Court found that the
fourth and fifth amendments protected "the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life" from governmental invasions.9 Similarly, in
Mapp v. Ohio 10 the Court found the fourth amendment created a "right
to privacy, no less important than any other rights carefully and particu-
larly reserved to the people". 1 In the landmark case, Griswold v. Con-
necticut,12 the Court found that the right to privacy exists in the
"penumbras, formed by the emanations from [the] guarantees" in the
Bill of Rights. 3 The Court found these penumbras in the first amend-
ment right of association;' 4 the third amendment prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers "'in any house' in time of peace";15 the fourth
amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures;"'1 6 and
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 17 The Court
stated that these guarantees created "zones of privacy." 8
The ninth amendment 9 affords additional rights not specifically
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.2" Justice Goldberg in his concurrence
7. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647, 663, cert denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
8. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
9. Id. at 630.
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. Id. at 655-56.
12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13. Id. at 484.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I (specifically, "the right of the people peaceably to assemble"); Gris-
wold, 381 U.S. at 484.
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. III (specifically, "[n]o Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in
any house"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (specifically, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
17. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (specifically, "nor shall [a person] be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
18. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (specifically, "[t]he enumeration ... of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people").
20. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-89 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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in Griswold stated, "[T]he Ninth Amendment shows a belief.., that
fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first
eight amendments."2 1 In the view of Goldberg, Harlan, and White, the
right of privacy can be found in the Constitution in the reference to "lib-
erty";2 2 therefore, it is protected by the fourteenth amendment.2 3 The
preamble to the Constitution refers to "Blessings of Liberty."24 The fifth
amendment states: "nor shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."2 Finally, the fourteenth
amendment 26 extends this protection to the state level.2  Therefore, the
"liberty" interest is protected by due process.28
A person's liberty interests include family privacy. Justice Harlan
stated in Poe v. Ullman29 that a "most fundamental aspect of 'liberty' [is]
the privacy of the home";3° invasion of this privacy can take place "with-
out any physical intrusion whatever into the home."'" Therefore, the
right to rear a family is implicit in the right of privacy.32 However, this
does not mean that the right of privacy is an absolute.33 The Court has
construed this idea of rearing a family to consist of the upbringing and
educating of the children.34 For example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in In re Quinlan 35 did not allow a father to exercise a child's con-
stitutional right to privacy on his own behalf.3 6 The court restricted the
parental right of privacy by stating "[the] parental right of privacy has
been recognized... in the context of determining the rearing of infants
21. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); Id. at 502 (White,
J., concurring).
23. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); Id. at 502 (White,
J., concurring).
24. U.S. CoNsr. preamble (specifically "In order to .. . secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our posterity").
25. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (specifically, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
27. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
28. See id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
29. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
30. Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan's dissent in Poe was cited with much approval in
Griswold.
31. Id. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT 212 n.63 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT's BIOETHICS COMMISSION].
33. Poe, 367 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
35. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert denied sub non. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
36. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 664.
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and, . . . involved 'continuing life styles.' " The court allowed Mr.
Quinlan to assert the right of privacy on his daughter's behalf a8 There-
fore, when a right of privacy is being asserted, it extends only to the point
where it infringes upon another's rights. The parents' right to exercise
the privacy of the home, therefore, is limited by the child's right to life. 9
In Roe v. Wade," the Supreme Court found a right of privacy in the
Constitution and applied it to a woman's abortion decision.41 Subse-
quently, courts have expanded this right to include personal decisions to
decline medical treatment in certain circumstances.4' The Court found
that the right of personal privacy was limited to some degree by the
state's interests in "safeguarding health, in maintaining medical stan-
dards, and in protecting potential life."'4 3 Moreover, as pointed out by
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Wade: "[L]iberty is not guar-
anteed absolutely against deprivation, only against deprivation without
due process of law."' Therefore, although the Due Process Clause pro-
tects the right of privacy, the protection is limited by another's right to
life.
III. LIFE AND DEATH DECISIONS
No one person is equipped to make the life and death decisions for a
handicapped infant. The doctors, who possess the necessary medical ex-
pertise, lack the personal involvement needed to assess the individual
child's interests. Parents, on the other hand, may lack the technical
knowledge to evaluate the future medical situation objectively. This
Comment compares the positions of the various people involved in the
decision.
37. Id.
38. Id. But cf Smith, In re Quinlan: Defining the Basis for Terminating Life Support Under the
Right of Privacy, 12 TULSA L.J. 150, 161 (1976) (arguing that the right of privacy precludes a guard-
ian from making personal medical decisions for an incompetent patient). The question of whether a
minor has a right to privacy has not been squarely addressed by the courts.
39. Comment, Defective Newborns: Inconsistent Application of Legal Principles Emphasized by
the Infant Doe Case, 14 TEx. TECH L. REv. 569, 572, 587-88 (1983).
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. Id. at 152-53.
42. See, eg, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, -, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
at -, 355 A.2d at 663. These cases allowed a guardian to make the personal decision to decline
treatment.
43. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154.
44. Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 22:259
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A. The Parents' Input in the Decision
Parents should be the primary decision-makers.45 The other parties
involved in the decision should give great deference to the parents'
wishes in the matter. As Professor Shapiro observed:
In most cases, parents have a right to make fundamental decisions
with regard to their children in areas such as education and lifestyle.
The United States Supreme Court has said: "[I]t is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first with the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations that the state can neither supply nor hinder." 46
The parents are in the best position to evaluate the impact of a handi-
capped child on the family.47 Likewise, the family setting affects the in-
terests of the handicapped infant.48 A court, or possibly a doctor, may
draw this factor to the parents' attention, but only the parents can evalu-
ate the impact this will have on all individuals concerned. The right de-
cision will necessarily vary from family to family.
The family's financial ability is another factor that must be consid-
ered. Our society frowns upon measuring the worth of a human life in
dollars, but the fact remains that someone must pay for the often ex-
tremely expensive medical procedures required for severely handicapped
children. In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler,49 the court
pointed out that the family's financal resources had to be taken into con-
sideration. The court stated: "[T]he long-term interests of physically
disabled newborns may be affected by thrusting the child into situations
where economic ... effects on the family as a whole are so adverse that
the effort to preserve an unwanted child may require concurrent atten-
tion to procedures for adoption or other placement."50 It would not be
fair to parents of a disabled child to mandate that heroic procedures be
implemented which would prove to be of little value and yet provide the
parents with no funding to pay for the procedures.5' This was one of the
major criticisms of the Department of Health and Human Service regula-
45. See Comment, supra note 39 at 571. See also PRESIDENT'S BIoETHicS COMMISSION, supra
note 32, at 207 & n.62 (discussion of the traditional although rebuttable presumption that parents
are the appropriate decisionmakers).
46. See Shapiro, supra note 3, at 145-46 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)).
47. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D.D.C. 1983).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 400.
51. Comment, The Legacy of Infant Doe, 34 BAYLOR L. REv. 699, 713 (1982).
5
Mangrum: Medical Treatment of Handicapped Infants: Who Should Make the Dec
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1986
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
tions52 discussed in this Comment.
Another factor that parents must consider is the family's religious
convictions. The Constitution protects religious beliefs,53 but conduct in
pursuit of religious beliefs is not necessarily protected.5 4 For example,
courts have ordered blood transfusions for Jehovah's Witnesses whose
religious beliefs prohibit such procedures.5" Society will not tolerate the
practice of religious beliefs that will senselessly endanger a life.56 But as
long as the decision of the parents is within the realm of reason, the
parents should be allowed to give their religious beliefs full weight.57
A final consideration is that the parents might face charges of child
abuse and neglect.5 One commentator argues that parents who with-
hold medical treatment from their children might be prosecuted for child
neglect, or even homicide, if the ommission of treatment results in the
child's death.59
The parents are the ones who must live with the decisions concern-
ing which medical procedures are used.60 They, of course, need the gui-
dance of a physician because very few parents have any medical
expertise.61 Parents can best evaluate opinions and facts from all sources
in the light of the family's economic, emotional, and religious position;62
therefore, much deference should be given to their final decision. The
Heckler court pointed out that the parent's wishes should be
recognized.63
One caveat must be added. Some parents may not be capable or
52. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1985).
53. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
54. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 661.
55. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd 390
U.S. 598 (1968); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971); Mulenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128
N.J. Super 498, 320 A.2d 518 (Law Div. 1974); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center,
49 Misc.2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup.Ct. 1965).
56. See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 661 (cases are cited where the courts have inter-
vened in religious practices such as the handling of poisonous snakes and cases where the courts
have required when refused due to religious beliefs).
57. See PRESIDENr'S BIOETHICS CoMMISSION, supra note 32, at 215.
58. See Comment, supra note 51, at 710.
59. Robertson, Involuntary Euthenasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 213, 217 (1975). See also Annas, Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment for Minors, 23 J. FAM. L.
217, 221 (1984-85).
60. See PRESIDENT'S BIoTHics CoMMISSION, supra note 32, at 210-11 (discussing the parents'
responsibility in the decision-making and the possible feelings of guilt that may follow the decisions).
61. See PRESIDEN S BIOETHMCS COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 216 (explaining that in order to
make good decisions, parents must have relevant, up-to-date medical information).
62. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 400.
63. Id. The court criticized the Secretary of HHS for not considering the wishes of the parents.
[Vol. 22:259
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willing to make the appropriate decisions.6r When the parents' decision
leaves the realm of reason, there must be a safety net in place to protect
the infant.6" The Assocation for Retarded Citizens argued in its brief in
the Bowen case that "state laws are based on the premise that the parent
generally will act in the best interests of their child, but that that assump-
tion may be faulty in the unusual circumstances of the birth of a handi-
capped child.""
B. The Doctors' Input in the Decision
Several of the amicus briefs presented in support of the Department
of Health and Human Services in Bowen stated that it is the doctor who
actually makes the treatment decisions because "parents do not have the
informational and emotional resources available to them to make a com-
petent decision immediately after the birth of their disabled child."'67 In
a recent interview with Stuart Gerson, a lawyer representing the Ameri-
can Hospital Association, he stated that if doctors erroneously advise
withholding treatment, it is due to a lack of information about available
medical procedures, not a discriminative motive.68 However, the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, "HHS," maintained that doc-
tors do withhold medical treatment prompted by discrimination.69 Judge
Muir in In re Quinlan 70 stated:
Doctors... to treat a patient, must deal with medical tradition and
past case histories. They must be guided by what they do know. The
extent of their training, their experience, consultations with other phy-
sicians, must guide their decision-making processes in providing care
to their patient. The nature, extent and duration of care by societal
standards is the responsibility of a physician. The morality and con-
science of our society places this responsibility in the hands of the phy-
sician. What justification is there to remove it from the control of the
medical profession and place it in the hands of the courts? 7 1
64. See PRESIDENTS BioET-ics COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 211.
65. Id. at 216 (suggesting that if parental decision making is faulty, court intervention may be
necessary).
66. Amicus Brief of the Association for Retarded Citizens of the United States at 26-28, Bowen,
106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986) (quoted in Hoving, The 'Baby Doe' Cases, 72 A.B.A. J. 50, 53 (April 1,
1986)).
67. Hoving, supra note 66, at 52. For the specific arguments see Amicus Brief of the American
Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities at 29, Bowen, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986); Amicus Brief of Ameri-
can Association on Mental Deficiency at 15 n.29, Bowen, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986); Amicus Brief of the
Association for Retarded Citizens of the United States at 18-26, Bowen, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
68. Id.
69. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2129 (White, J., dissenting).
70. 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
71. Id. at 259, 348 A.2d at 818.
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Professor Robertson argues that withholding treatment that results
in death is homicide,72 that physicians who withhold treatment are com-
mitting homicide, and that physicians can be prosecuted for this.73 He
claims that nurses can also be prosecuted as accomplices. 74
There have been few, if any, of these prosecutions 7 because this
type of crime is not a priority. Prosecutors have an over abundance of
murders, rapes, and other crimes of violence with which to deal; the
crime of "withholding treatment" is near the bottom of their list.76
Although criminal charges are seldom brought against physicians, they
have felt the lash of civil suits for malpractice. So, like the parents, crim-
inal and civil liability is a factor that the doctor must consider.
Most doctors are dedicated to the preservation of life and could seek
court intervention if the parents' decisions were outside what the doctor
would consider reasonable. This provides a safety net for the handi-
capped infant. Next to the parents, the physician's opinion should be
given every consideration. After all, he is the expert in the matter.
C. The Hospitals' Input in the Decision
The HHS regulations, 7 which are no longer in effect due to the re-
cent Supreme Court ruling,78 set out a model for an Infant Care Review
Committee, "ICRC". 79 The Court did not rule against this section of the
regulations.8 ° It suggested that each hospital have an ICRC. Many
commentators have presented this idea, including those working on the
President's Commission for the study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavorial Research, "President's Bioethics Com-
mission", which "had suggested some form of internal ethical review
committee to help sensitize the hospital staff to ethical problems and act
as an advisory board when called upon."81 The model outlined by the
72. Robertson, supra note 59, at 224-25. Contra In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert.
denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). This case involved a comatose young
woman, Karen Quinlan, for whom there was no hope of recovery to a cognitive state. The court
appointed her father as guardian and allowed him to authorize the termination of the extraordinary
medical means used in sustaining her life pursuant to Karen's right of privacy. The court did not
find such a termination to be homicide, even if death resulted.
73. See also Comment, supra note 51, at 710.
74. Robertson, supra note 59, at 224.
75. Comment, supra note 51, at 711.
76. See Annas, supra note 59, at 221.
77. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1985).
78. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
79. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(a)(1985).
80. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2106.
81. See Annas, supra note 59, at 227.
[Vol. 22:259
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HHS was to be composed of at least seven members: a lay member, a
nurse, a physician, a hospital administrator, a disabled group representa-
tive, an attorney, and a member of the institution's medical staff who
would serve as chairperson. 2 The ICRC would review cases that in-
volved treatment termination and one committee member would act as
an advocate for the infant "to ensure that all considerations in favor of
the provision of life sustaining treatment are fully evaluated and
considered." 3
Courts have advocated the creation of ethics committees. In 1976,
Judge Muir in In re Quinlan 84 stated: "I suggest that it would be more
appropriate to provide a regular forum for more input and dialogue in
individual situations and to allow the responsibility of these judgments to
be shared."8" Judge Muir felt that an ethics committee would explore a
broader range of options for the patient and would diffuse the responsi-
bility for making judgments. 6
It must be noted that a few commentators do not feel that these
committees would be beneficial. Professor Annas has stated: "It is hard,
however, to understand how diffusing the responsibility-which would
be the case if you have an ethics committee say it's okay to treat or not to
treat-somehow yields a better or more ethical decision .... Committee
decision-making, at least in areas of life and death, is probably the worst
kind of decision-making we can have. '87
Overall, the creation of ethics committees must be encouraged.
These committees consider the infant family's wishes in the matter and
will also provide a second safety net for the infant if the parents' wishes
are not in the child's best interests.
Aside from the parents' wishes, the committee must also consider
the hospital's financial resources. The hospital's funding is not limitless.
The officials must allocate funds to the various departments.8 8 The ex-
pense of care units for extremely premature infants or the equipment nec-
essary for extensive surgical procedures may be beyond a hospital's
means. 9 For the federal government to mandate that such extensive
medical facilities be provided is absurd. As the court in American Acad-
82. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(f)(2) (1985).
83. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (f)(3)(ii)(E) (1985).
84. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 cert denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
85. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 668.
86. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 668-69.
87. See Annas, supra note 59, at 228-29.
88. See Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 400.
89. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2114 n.15.
9
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emy of Pediatrics v. Heckler90 stated: "Means of funding extensive care
. . . and for allocating scarce medical resources between defective
newborns and other newborns or other patients were also apparently not
considered [in the HHS regulations]. 91
A committee could look at all these factors: the parents' wishes, the
doctor's prognosis, and the hospital's capabilities-and render an impar-
tial decision as to whether the child's interests are being protected.
D. The State's Input in the Decision
Although the primary care and control of a child is left to the par-
ents, 92 the state will step in when evidence exists that the parents are not
fulfilling their obligations.9 The state can intervene when circumstances
show that the child's interests are being jeopardized.94 State intervention
can be achieved through state courts, state agencies, or a combination of
both.95 As one court said:
While... [the child] "belongs" to his parents, he belongs also to his
State .... [T]he fact [that] the child belongs to the State imposes upon
the State many duties. Chief among them is the duty to protect his
right to live and to grow up with a sound mind in a sound body, and to
brook no interference with that right by any person or organization.96
The courts represent the conscience of society.97 The common
moral judgment of the community at large is upheld by the state98
through the courts.99 In addition, child care has traditionally been under
the authority of the states."° So with state agencies monitoring the cases
of disabled infants and the courts in position to make final determina-
tions, we have yet another safety net protecting the infant's interests.
E. The Federal Government's Input in the Decision
The federal government has stated its interests in preservation of life
in the Declaration of Independence as self-evident truths "that all men
90. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
91. Id. at 400.
92. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
93. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 32, at 212.
94. See Comment, supra note 39, at 571.
95. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 32, at 214.
96. In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 90, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (1962).
97. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
98. Poe, 367 U.S. at 545-46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99. See Comment, supra note 39, at 571-72. For a discussion of the court's responsibility to
create "guideposts" for decisions involving termination of life see In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, -, 486
A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985).
100. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
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... are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness"10 1 and again
in the Constitution of the United States which provides that no person
will "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.",'0 2
However, the federal government's interests have to be weighed
against the individual's right to privacy.0 3 As the President's Bioethics
Commission stated: "a decision to forego life-sustaining treatment has
been firmly established as a Constitutionally protected right that can be
overcome only by marshalling countervailing considerations of substan-
tial weight."'1
4
The federal government has made two attempts to regulate the deci-
sions made in the area of medical treatment for disabled infants: The
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984105 and the HHS regulations. 06 The
HHS regulations have recently been invalidated by the Supreme
Court, 0 17 but the Child Abuse Amendments are still in place.
The proponents of federal government intervention emphasize uni-
formity in protecting infants' rights equally in all states. 08 This noble
aim, however, must be balanced against an individual's right to pri-
vacy.'0 9 The ultimate result is an ad hoe balancing of each case because
each case is different. A mandatory set of rules to be followed in every
situation would cause heartache and havoc.
IV. THE COURT'S DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE OF SECTION 504
OF THE REHABILITATION AT OF 1973
The event that shocked many people, in particular President Rea-
gan, and eventually led to the controversial HHS regulations was the
birth of a Baby Doe in April of 1982.110 The infant was born with
Down's Syndrome, which would result in retardation, and with a block-
age of his digestive tract that precluded normal feeding."' The parents
101. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
103. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
104. See PRESIDENT'S BIOETHIcS COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 32.
105. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984) (amendments to Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1982)).
106. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1985).
107. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. 2101, 2123 (1986).
108. See Hoving, supra note 66, at 53.
109. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
110. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2107.
111. See Hoving, supra note 66, at 50.
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refused to consent to the surgery necessary to correct the blockage and
further requested that food and water be withheld. 112 Although the hos-
pital sought judicial proceedings to override the parents' decision, the
state court refused stating that the parents had made a reasonable treat-
ment decision.' 13 The Indiana Supreme Court rejected a petition for a
writ of mandamus by a vote of three to one."I4 The infant was not given
food or water 1 5 and soon died while a stay was being sought in the
Supreme Court. The Court subsequently denied certiorari. 116
In response to the Bloomington case, President Reagan sent a direc-
tive to then HHS Secretary Schweiker" 7 who said: "The President has
instructed me to make absolutely clear to health care providers in this
nation that federal law does not allow medical discrimination against
handicapped infants.""'  This resulted in a letter to approximately 7,000
hospitals on May 18, 1982,11 from the H S putting them on notice that
it was "unlawful (under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973120]
for a recipient of federal financial assistance to withhold from a handi-
capped infant nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment re-
quired to correct a life-threatening condition if: (1) the withholding is
based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; and (2) the handicap
does not render treatment or nutritional sustenance contraindicated."1 2 1
Noncompliance could have resulted in a loss of federal funds.122
Ten months later, in May of 1982, the H S required that this notice
be conspicuously placed in every pediatric ward, maternity ward, deliv-
ery ward, and nursery.123 The notice was to have had a toll free, twenty-
four-hour "hotline" number that could be called by any person who sus-
pected that a handicapped infant was being denied medical care.124 The
caller's identity was to be held in strict confidence.' 25 The HHS officials
were given authority to take "immediate remedial action" which in-
volved twenty-four-hour access to the hospitals and their medical
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2107-08 n.5.
115. See Hoving, supra note 66, at 50.
116. Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
117. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2108.
118. See Annas, supra note 59, at 224.
119. Id.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
121. See Annas, supra note 59, at 224.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 225.
124. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2106.
125. See infra Appendix.
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records. 126
The American Academy of Pediatrics and others brought suit
against HHS and Margaret Heckler, the new HHS Secretary. 27 In April
of 1983, U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard Gesell found the regulations
invalid due to the failure of HHS to follow the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946 in promulgating the regulation. 128 Although Judge Gesell
found that procedural problems invalidated the HHS regulation, he also
suggested that the HHS was overstepping its bounds substantively.
29
The HHS did not appeal the district court's ruling, but instead reis-
sued the regulations as proposed rules in July of 1983.130 Interested par-
ties were given sixty days to comment on the proposed rules. The HHS
was dealing with the procedural process but was ignoring the substantive
issue of the proper governmental role in this area."'
There were few changes between the proposed regulations and the
final draft.132 However, a new section was added which mandated that
each state's child protective services agency establish procedures
126. The first "Baby Doe" regulations appeared at 48 Fed. Reg. 9630-9632 (1983).
127. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 395.
128. Id. at 399. The court found the HHS regulations failed to follow the Administrative Proce-
dure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 706, concerning the scope of review which reads:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall
... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-(A)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ....
Also the court found the regulations failed to meet the rule making procedures required by the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 before rules are to be promulgated. The sections violated were
5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) & § 553(d) (1982) which read:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register,
unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have
actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include-(l) a statement of
the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal
authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. [and]
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than
30 days before its effective date, except-() a substantive rule which grants or recognizes
an exemption or relieves a restriction; (2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with the rule.
129. The court in Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 402, stated:
But defendants and amiM in support of defendants read the regulation and thus the statute
[§ 504] far more broadly. It has been suggested by amici that the rule requires doctors and
parents to undertake heroic measures to preserve for as long as possible, despite expense
and a prognosis of certain death within months, the life of an anacephalic infant lacking all
or part of the brain and with no hope of ever achieving even the most rudimentary form of
consciousness.
Judge Gesell was suggesting that the regulation was substantively overbroad.
130. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846-30,852 (1983).
131. See Annas, supra note 59, at 226.
132. Id.
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designed "to prevent medical neglect of handicapped infants." 13 3
The HHS deemed that 97.5 percent of the comments received were
supportive of the regulations; however, many of the 16,739 letters were
generated through writing campaigns of "right to life" organizations.
1 34
Finally, the regulations were put into effect in January of 1984. The reg-
ulations read, in part: "[N]ourishment and medically beneficial treat-
ment (as determined with respect for reasonable medical judgments)
should not be withheld from handicapped infants solely on the basis of
their present or anticipated mental or physical impairments."' 35 The size
of the notice was to be no smaller than five by seven inches and was to be
located where nurses could see it.136
Before the final rules were promulgated, Baby Jane Doe was born
with multiple congenital defects in Long Island, New York.137 After
consulting with professionals, the parents decided to forego corrective
surgery which was potentially risky but likely to prolong the child's
life;138 however, it would not improve many of her handicaps. 3 9 The
parents decided to adopt conservative medical procedures which con-
sisted of antibiotics, good nutrition, and dressing of her exposed spinal
sac. 140
On October 16, 1983, an unrelated attorney ified suit in the New
York Supreme Court to have a guardian ad litem appointed for Baby
Jane Doe.141 Subsequent to his appointment, the guardian requested that
the hospital initiate the necessary surgery. 42 On October 20, the trial
court granted this relief;143 but this decision was reversed the following
day by the Appellate Division which stated that the "concededly con-
cerned and loving parents" had "chosen one course of appropriate medi-
cal treatment over another" and made an informed decision that was "in
133. The mandated procedures for state agencies read in part: "[A] requirement that health care
providers report on a timely basis... known or suspected instances of unlawful medical neglect of
handicapped infants [to the HHS]." 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(c)(1)(i) (1985).
134. See Annas, supra note 59, at 226.
135. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1985).
136. Id.
137. "[The] multiple birth defects includ[ed] spina bifida, microcephaly (an abnormally small
head) and hydrocephalus (an accumulation of fluid in the cranium). There was an extremely high
risk that the child would be severely retarded." Hoving, supra note 66, at 50.
138. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2109.
139. Id.
140. See Hoving, supra note 66, at 50.
141. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2109.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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the best interests of the infant."'" This decision was affirmed by the
New York Court of Appeals but on different grounds.
145
While these actions were in progress, the HHS received a complaint
that the infant was being "discriminatorily denied medically indicated
treatment. 1 46 Thereafter, HHS attempted to acquire Baby Jane Doe's
medical records in order to ascertain if the hospital was in compliance
with section 504.147 The hospital denied the request because the parents
had not consented to the release of these records. Subsequently, HHS
filed suit in district court to compel release of the records and lost.1
48
The Second Circuit affirmed the decision in United States v. University
Hospital 149 and held that in the absence of a clear congressional directive
"it is congress, rather than an executive agency, that must weigh the
competing interests at stake .... Until congress has spoken, it would be
an unwarranted exercise of judicial power to approve the type of investi-
gation that has precipitated this lawsuit."' 50 Baby Jane Doe is severely
handicapped but is still alive today.' 5 '
The government did not seek certiorari in University Hospital.52
However, it did seek review of the adverse ruling in Bowen v. American
Hospital Association i3 which was argued before the Supreme Court on
January 15, 1986. In Bowen, the Supreme Court invalidated most of the
newly promulgated HHS regulations.'54 The Court held that section 504
144. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (1983), aff'd, 60
N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983). The
court further elaborated:
The record confirms that the failure to perform the surgery will not place the infant in
imminent danger of death, although surgery might significantly reduce the risk of infec-
tion. On the other hand, successful results could also be achieved with antibiotic therapy.
Further, while the mortality rate is higher where conservative medical treatment is used, in
this particular case the surgical procedures also involved a great risk of depriving the infant
of what little function remains in her legs, and would also result in recurring urinary tract
and possibly kidney infections, skin infections and edemas of the limbs.
Id. 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87.
145. Weber v. Stoney Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 211-13, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187-88, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 64-65 (1983). On October 28, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds
that the trial court should not have allowed a petition by a stranger who had no direct interest in, or
had any relationship to the involved parties, and had failed to request the aid of the responsible state
agency. The court found "no precedent or authority for the proceeding." Id.
146. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2110.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 161.
151. See Hoving, supra note 66, at 50.
152. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2111.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2106, 2123.
15
Mangrum: Medical Treatment of Handicapped Infants: Who Should Make the Dec
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1986
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22:259
did not authorize the H-S to interfere in the decision-making process of
parents, hospitals, and state officials concerning handicapped children. 55
V. THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE HHS REGULATIONS
The Supreme Court's decision in Bowen v. American HospitalAssoci-
ation 156 does not mean that there are no controls over the well-being of
handicapped infants. The decision only struck down the HHS's author-
ity to regulate the decision-making process. Moreover the Court's ruling
did not affect the statutes already in place, and it left open the possibility
for Congress to continue legislating statutes that directly addressed the
problem. The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 cover this area quite
adequately.1 57  The Court's decision did not prevent Congress from en-
acting further legislation to remedy the situation. Congress does have
the power to enact legislation regulating the decision-making process. 58
The Court merely ruled that Congress did not delegate that particular
power to the HHS, in this instance.15 9 Many advocates of the HHS regu-
lations argued that the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 were not suffi-
cient to adequately protect handicapped infants because they did not
create a direct obligation on the hospital. 160 If this should prove to be
155. See id. at 2123.
156. Id.
157. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984). Among other
changes, Congress amended the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5102
(1982), to include the care and treatment of handicapped infants. Section 121 (3) of the Child Abuse
Amendments amended Section 3 of the Act to include this clause:
(3) [TMhe term "withholding of medically indicated treatment" means the failure to re-
spond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (including appro-
priate nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, in the treating physician's or
physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating
or correcting all such conditions, except that the term does not include the failure to pro-
vide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant
when, in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, (A) the in-
fant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment would
(i) merely prolong dying, (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's
life threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant;
or (C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survivial of
the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane.
158. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
159. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2120-23.
160. The Association on Mental Deficiency's amicus brief before the Supreme Court in Bowen
stated:
Section 504 declares that federal funds will not be used in discriminatory ways. The Child
Abuse Amendments require the withdrawal of federal funds from state child welfare agen-
cies that do not protect handicapped children from discriminatory denial of treatment.
But if the latter law were interpreted to eliminate enforcement of the former statute
[Section 504] the Secretary would be required to deny funds to the welfare agency but
would be required to continue funding the recipient who actually engaged in the discrimi-
natory conduct.
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the situation, Congress can easily enact necessary statutes.
Another argument that has been made in favor of the federal regula-
tions is that the regulations would create uniformity among the various
states: that an infant in one state can be assured of the same protection
as an infant in another state. The American Association on Mental Defi-
ciency stated in its amicus brief in Bowen:
"[A]s in other areas of civil rights enforcement, experience suggests
that states will not be uniformly diligent in carrying out their responsi-
bilities. Federal enforcement capability is therefore appropriate and
necessary to guarantee that handicapped children are not denied pro-
tection of their right to nutrition or medical care merely because of
their state of residence." 161
If this argument proves true, Congress can enact the necessary legislation
to ensure uniformity among the various states.
As a result of the provisions in the Child Abuse Amendments of
1984,162 the Supreme Court's decision did not leave handicapped infants
vulnerable to practices of starvation and dehydration in order to acceler-
ate death. The Amendments require that a child be given "medically
indicated treatment" which includes nutrition, hydration, and medi-
cine. 163 These Child Abuse Amendments seem to protect the handi-
capped infants adequately. In an interview, before the Supreme Court's
ruling in Bowen, Surgeon General Koop, a supporter of the HHS regula-
tions, admitted the Child Abuse Amendments work to protect the cur-
rent "Baby Does." Hence, further federal intervention may not be
required." Another plus for the Child Abuse Amendments is that they
allow the states, rather than the federal government, to monitor the
cases. This was one of the objections to the HHS regulations. Many
believed that this area was traditionally a state function and should be
left to the states. 65 This is the exact result of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Bowen. Thus, the Child Abuse Amendments are the only federal
law governing such cases; and in turn, these amendments pass the au-
thority to the state level.1 66 The state is authorized by the Child Abuse
161. Amicus Brief of American Association on Mental Deficiency at 23, Bowen, 106 S. Ct. 2101
(1986).
162. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984).
163. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, supra note 157.
164. Hoving, supra note 66, at 53.
165. Id. at 52.
166. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984). Congress
amended the Child Abuse and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1982) to provide for state interven-
tion in instances of medical neglect of disabled infants. Section 122 of the Child Abuse Amendment
amended § 4 (b)(2) of the Act by inserting the following clause:
(K) [W]ithin one year after the date of the enactment of the Child Abuse Amendments of
17
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Amendments to implement procedures or programs to respond to report-
ings of medical neglect. 167 States now have the authority to pursue any
legal remedies, including the initiation of legal proceedings, to prevent
the withholding of medically indicated treatment.
168
Another concern of many, when the Supreme Court struck down
the HHS regulations, was that various states would lack uniformity in
protecting the disabled infant. 169  Possibly, the Child Abuse Amend-
ments have relieved this problem by setting out model guidelines. The
Amendments provide for the Secretary of HHS to publish model guide-
lines which will "serve the purposes of educating hospital personnel and
families of disabled infants with life-threatening conditions, recom-
mending institutional policies and guidelines concerning the withhold-
ing of medically indicated treatment.., from such infants, and offering
counsel and review in cases involving disabled infants with life-
threatening conditions."' 170 Therefore, the Child Abuse Amendments
may have been the best solution to protect the handicapped infants.
They provide protection for these infants across the nation, but allow
each state to adopt this protection within its own framework, a major
shortcoming of the HHS regulations.
Most people would agree that conservative or ordinary medical
treatment should be given in all instances. On the other hand, heroic or
extraordinary medical treatment should never be mandated. 17 1 If the
parents of the child, the doctor, and possibly the hospital ethics commit-
tee agree that heroic measures should be utilized, then heroic medical
1984, have in place for the purpose of responding to the reporting of medical neglect (in-
eluding instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants
with life-threatening conditions), procedures or programs, or both (within the State child
protective services system), to provide for (i) coordination and consultation with individu-
als designated by and within appropriate health-care facilities, (ii) prompt notification by
individuals designated by and within appropriate health-care facilities of cases of suspected
medical neglect (including instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment from
disabled infants with life-threatening conditions), and (iii) authority, under State law, for
the State child protecive service system to pursue any legal remedies, including the author-
ity to initiate legal proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiciton, as may be necessary to
prevent the withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-
threatening conditions (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (1985).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Hoving, supra note 66, at 53.
170. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 124 (b)(1), 98 Stat. 1749, 1754
(1984).
171. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 664. The court stated: "We think that the State's
interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights
overcome the State interest."
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treatment should be undertaken. But a decision to the contrary must not
be construed as euthanasia.172 This point of view was expressed by Pope
Pius XII in an address to anesthesiologists on November 24, 1957.173 He
made the point that the "interruption of attempts at resuscitation, even
when it causes the arrest of circulation, is not more than an indirect
cause of the cessation of life."174 The Pope then expressed the opinion
that this was not considered euthanasia.175 Professor George Annas of
Boston University176 has concluded that most people, including those in
the Reagan Admininstration and the Surgeon General, agree that there
can be cases in which an infant can be "so severely ill or so severely
handicapped that it actually would be better off, from the infant's per-
spective, for that infant to die." '177 In addition, "that given the child's
suffering, the treatment itself would be worse for the child than
death." 178 All things considered, the best alternative is to decide each
case on an ad hoc basis. 179
VI. CONCLUSION
Life and death decisions must often be made when a severely handi-
capped infant is born. The persons closest to the situation should have
priority in the decision-making. However, society has an interest in pro-
viding a safety net for those infants who might suffer from an unreasona-
ble decision. The parents should be the primary decision makers in
conjunction with the physician in charge of the case. It is strongly sug-
gested that every hospital establish an ethics committee to review these
decisions. State agencies and courts are present to provide added protec-
tion for the infant's interest.
172. See id. at 658.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. George J. Annas has a B.A., 1967, J.D., 1970, M.P.H., 1972, Harvard University. He is the
Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law at Boston University Schools of Medicine and Public
Health. He has published many works including a book titled RIGHTS OF DoctoRs, NuRSEs, AND
ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (1981). Publications on this subject include The Baby Doe Regu-
lations: Governmental Intervention in Neonatal Rescue Medicine, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 618
(1984) and Ethics Committees in Neonatal Care: Substantive Protection or Procedural Diversion?, 74
AM. . Pun. HEALTH 843 (1984). Professor Annas also writes a column on health law called Law
and the Life Sciences for The Hastings Center Report and a column called Public Health and the Law
for the American Journal of Public Health. These works and others have given Professor Annas a
reputation as an expert in medical-legal areas. See Annas, supra note 59, at 217.
177. Annas, supra note 59, at 223. But see, Capron, Borrowed Lessons: The Role of Ethical
Distinctions in Framing Law on Life-Sustaining Treatment, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 647, 657.
178. See Annas, supra note 59, at 223.
179. But see Capron, supra note 177, at 657.
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The Supreme Court in Bowen left the authority to police the
decision-making process to the states. The only other federal involve-
ment is the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984. At last, these Amend-
ments inherently pass the authority to the states. This is as it should be
because blanket mandatory requirements cannot be applied. Each case
must be decided on its own merits because each case is different; there-
fore, an ad hoc decision-making process must be utilized.
Barbara J. Mangrum
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APPENDIX
NOTICE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Office for Civil Rights
DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND CARE FOR
HANDICAPPED INFANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS PROHIBITED
BY FEDERAL LAW. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION
ACT OF 1973 STATES THAT
"NO OTHERWISE QUALIFIED HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUAL
SHALL, SOLELY BY REASON OF HANDICAP, BE EX-
CLUDED FROM PARTICIPATION IN, BE DENIED THE BEN-
EFITS OF, OR BE SUBJECTED TO DISCRIMINATION UNDER
ANY PROGRAM OF ACTIVITY RECEIVING FEDERAL FI-
NANCIAL ASSISTANCE."
Any person having knowledge that a handicapped infant is being dis-
criminatorily denied food or customary medical care should immedi-
ately contact:
Handicapped Infant Hotline
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Washington, D.C. 20201
Phone 800-368-1019 (Available 24 hours a day) - TTY Capability
In Washington, D.C. call 863-0100
OR
Your State Child Protective Agency
Federal Law prohibits retaliation or intimidation against any person who
provides information about possible violation of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.
Identity of callers will be held confidential.
Failure to feed and care for infants may also violate the criminal and civil
laws of your state.
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